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Abstract. “Coherent” measures of a bank’s whole risk capital imply a structure of a bank’s optimal 
credit portfolio that is independent of its deposits and the expected deposit rate, of expected bank-
ruptcy costs and of expected costs of regulatory capital. 
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1. Introduction 
In almost every developed country there are compulsory banking capital requirements that aim at 
sustaining the stability of the financial sector. According to the new capital adequacy framework 
(Basel II) finally adopted by the Basel Committee in June 2004 a bank’s required regulatory capi-
tal (RC) is based on so-called economic capital describing that capital amount “that a firm be-
lieves is necessary to absorb potential losses associated with each of the included risks” (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2003, p. 1). But since banks are legally obliged to make 
provisions against expected losses, the capital requirement RC only aims at the problem of unex-
pected losses (see Kupiec, 2003). We thus may define a bank’s required whole risk capital 
(WRC) as the sum of its economic or regulatory capital and of its expected losses, because the 
latter leads to provisions a bank can only make if it is furnished with enough capital. 
Mostly, the WRC is calculated as the Value-at-Risk (VaR), although the Value-at-Risk ex-
hibits some well-known unfavorable features. In particular, according to Artzner et al. (1997), as 
a consequence of the missing subadditivity of the VaR, two banks that merge may ceteris paribus 
face higher capital requirements than the sum of their individual requirements before the merger. 
Certainly, this finding is counterintuitive and may induce rather adverse incentive effects for 
banks regarding their decisions on organizational structures.  
Therefore, with  1 L   and  2 L   as two uncertain losses from two different credits 1 and 2, 
Artzner et al. (1997, 1999) and Frey and McNeil (2002) postulated four axioms that should be 
met by a reasonable (“coherent”) measure of the whole risk capital WRC which – after subtrac-
tion of overall expected losses – yields the required regulatory capital: 
(Ax1)  12 1 2 WRC(L L ) WRC(L ) WRC(L ) +≤ +     (subadditivity), 
(Ax2)  12 1 2 L L WRC(L ) WRC(L ) ≤ ⇒ ≤     (monotonicity),    2
(Ax3)  11 W R C ( L) W R C ( L) λ⋅ =λ⋅   for all λ  ≥  0 (positive homogeneity), 
(Ax4)  11 WRC(L L) WRC(L ) L += +   for all certain losses L (translation-invariance). 
While (Ax1) has already been explained, without (Ax2) ceteris paribus higher losses with 
probability one would possibly result in lower requirements of WRC. (Ax3) just implies that the 
summation of an arbitrary number of perfectly correlated credits should lead to a corresponding 
increase in the whole risk capital, and according to (Ax4) certain losses have to be accounted for 
completely by additional capital requirements regardless of a bank’s other loss risks. Addition-
ally, (Ax4) implies the natural identity WRC(L WRC(L)) 0 −=  : The supply of the adequate 
amount WRC(L)   of capital according to a loss distribution L   reduces additional requirements to 
zero. 
Obviously, axioms (Ax1) to (Ax4) sound quite reasonable. Moreover, as we want to show 
in the next section, as long as the whole risk capital satisfies these axioms, the optimal structure 
of a bank’s credits may be independent of certain influence factors like the costs of regulatory 
capital and a bank’s expected bankruptcy costs, thus simplifying a bank’s portfolio decision to a 
great extent. 
2. The setting 
To be more precise, consider a risk-neutral bank in a one-period-framework with uncertain cash 
flows  1 c   at time 1. Define Bb as the amount of money lent to borrower b = 1, …,  ˆ b at a contrac-
tual interest rate of 
(B)
b r  and B =  ˆ 1 b (B , ..., B ) as the vector of all credits granted by the bank at 
time t = 0 to borrowers. Thus, 
(B)
bb B( 1r) ⋅+  characterizes the amount of money borrower b has to 
return at t = 1. Certainly, some borrowers will not be able to repay the whole amount 
(B)
bb B( 1r) ⋅+ . We use L(B)   to describe the bank’s uncertain overall loss from such problems.   3
Moreover, the bank may lend or borrow on the interbanking money market at a given interest rate 
r
(f) for lending and borrowing with a total investment of A (A > 0: lending, A < 0: borrowing). 
We assume this lending and borrowing to be due just a short time before credits and deposits are 
so that we can consider lending and borrowing on the interbanking market to be risk-free. It 
seems plausible to assume that a bank’s deposit rates are lower than r
(f). Each bank will therefore 
choose the maximum possible amount D
(max) of deposits, as choices D < D
(max) would forgo risk-
less gains otherwise possible by investing additional deposits D
(max)−D at r
(f) on the interbanking 
market. We denote with 
(max) (D )
d E(r )   the corresponding expected (average) deposit rate to be paid 
by the bank under consideration. 
Under the plausible premise of binding banking capital regulation, the bank’s required 
whole risk capital consists of provisions for expected losses E(L(B))   and the bank’s (additional) 
regulatory capital RC(B). While we assume that the bank may acquire capital to account for ex-
pected losses at a given interest rate 
1 (WRC ) r,   additional capital requirements RC(B) may lead to 
increasing (marginal) costs of capital 
2 (WRC ) (RC) r: r =  . We thus have 
(RC) r( R C ( B ) )   with 
(RC) r/ R C 0 ∂∂ ≥   while 
1 (WRC ) r const. =   Finally, we have to account for the bank’s budget con-
straint  ˆ 1 b B ... B A ++ +=















: A (1 r ) B (1 r ) E(L(B)) (2 E(r )) D (1 E(r ))




=⋅+ + ⋅+ − ⋅+ − ⋅+







as the bank’s expected cash flow before subtracting additional expected costs of capital holding 
RC(B). A “perfect” bank regulation might accomplish that the probability of default and thus   4
expected bankruptcy costs are (almost) independent of a bank’s behavior by requiring a certain 
regulatory capital RC. However, for real-life situations it sounds more plausible to assume that 
situations with ceteris paribus higher requirements of RC coincide with higher banks’ default 
probabilities and thus higher expected bankruptcy costs C(RC) for the bank under consideration: 
∂ C(RC)/∂ RC ≥  0. Summing up, we have 
(RC)
11 B E(c (B)) E(c (B)) RC(B) [1 E(r (RC(B)))] C(RC(B)) max.!
− =− ⋅ + − →    (2) 
as the bank’s objective function. Ceteris paribus, the bank will prefer alternatives with higher 
values for  1 E(c )
−   and lower values for RC.  
3. Implications 
The axioms (Ax1) to (Ax4) for a bank’s whole risk capital imply certain properties for its corre-
sponding regulatory capital that serves as a defense against unexpected losses: 
Lemma. Let (Ax1) to (Ax4) be true, then the regulatory capital RC = WRC− ()  EL satisfies (Ax1), 
(Ax3) and the property 
(P4)  += 11 RC(L L) RC(L )   for all certain losses L. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
RC thus possesses all relevant features that are known from the standard deviation as the 
most prominent measure of risk. Consider now a bank that is aiming at the maximization of the 
objective function (2) and that is facing a legally defined RC that corresponds to WRC satisfying 
(Ax1) to (Ax4). Let B





= ∑ , i.e. as the overall outstanding risky credits so that 
we may define yb = Bb/B
(sum) as the fractions of uncertain credits in the bank’s overall risky credit 
subportfolio. Then, the Lemma enables us to derive the following   5
Proposition. 1) Assume that an inner solution for the optimization of B
(sum) does exist. Then opti-
mal fractions 
** ( ) * / =
sum
bb y B B  do not depend on 
(R C) E(r (RC ))  , D
(max), and r
(D). Moreover, they 
are the same for all monotone increasing functions C(RC). Changes of the regulatory bank capi-
tal from RC(B) to f(RC(B)) with ∂ f(RC(B))/∂ RC(B) ≥  0 do not affect the optimal credit portfolio 
structure, either. 2) Sufficient conditions for the existence of an inner solution for B
(sum) to the 
bank’s optimization problem are expected bankruptcy costs C and/or expected costs 
() () 
RC Er  o f  
regulatory capital being strictly convex in B
(sum) given optimal credit portfolio structures. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
According to our Proposition, as a consequence of coherent whole risk capital, the structure 
of a bank’s optimal credit portfolio (if existing) does not depend on the general level of regula-
tory capital requirements, i.e. any tightening of capital requirements RC to f(RC) with ∂ f/∂ RC ≥  0 
will not affect the structure of a bank’s risky subportfolio, but only its amount. Moreover, a bank 
has not to bother about the precise functional relationship between regulatory capital and ex-
pected bankruptcy costs as long as these relationships can be described by arbitrary monotone 
increasing functions. Further, it does not matter, either, how the expected costs of regulatory 
capital rise with a bank’s additional demand for RC. Finally, the structure of the credit portfolio 
does not depend on the amount of deposits that is chosen by the bank nor on the corresponding 
deposit rate. 
The rationale for our Proposition is that, for given credit portfolio structure, variations of 
the amount of a bank’s riskless lending or borrowing imply combinations of  1 E(c )
−   and RC that 
all lie on a straight line with a fixed starting point ( 1 E(c )
−   = 
(max) (max) (f ) (D )
d D( rE ( r) ) ⋅− ; RC = 0) 
being independent of the credit portfolio structure. All achievable lines thus differ only by their 
slopes and can therefore be unambiguously compared as long as a bank prefers ceteris paribus   6
higher values for  1 E(c )
−   and lower values for RC. The situation is analogously to that underlying 
the famous two-fund separation theorem of Tobin (1958) for mean-variance investors. 
4. Discussion 
The separation result of the last section simplifies the bank’s decision problem tremendously and 
may serve as a further argument for coherent risk capital definitions. Certainly, our results are the 
consequences of some simplifying assumptions. In particular, we assume credits to be perfectly 
divisible and the bank to act as a pure price-taker at least on the credit market. However, since 
any single credit contributes only to a minor degree to a bank’s overall portfolio, the assumption 
of divisibility might be a satisfactory approximation of the real-life situation. Moreover, intense 
interbanking competition will prevent banks from acting in another way than as price-takers. 
More importantly, we assume a possibility for riskless lending and borrowing on the inter-
banking market, although we may take positive default probabilities of a bank into account. We 
therefore must propose that lending and borrowing on the interbanking market is due, before 
credits and deposits are payable. Since interbanking money market transactions are indeed often 
very short-term oriented, our setting seems to be reasonable. In addition, according to part 2) of 
the Proposition, even for C(RC) ≡  0, i.e. (in particular) for situations without any default prob-
lems for regulated banks so that interbanking lending and borrowing are “naturally” riskless, an 
inner solution for the bank’s optimization problem may exist and thus the separation result re-
mains in effect. Moreover, part 1) of the Proposition will also hold true for situations with no 
riskless borrowing opportunity at all, as long as there is a possibility for riskless lending (by buy-
ing government notes and bonds) and the bank management is sure to make use of this option. 
Summarizing, we deem it interesting to further analyze the portfolio selection consequences of 
coherent risk capital requirements in more detail.   7
AppendixFormelabschnitt (nächster) 
Proof of the Lemma: 
(Ax1):  
12 1 2
12 12 1 1 2 2
12 1 2
WRC(L L ) WRC(L ) WRC(L )
RC(L L ) E(L L ) RC(L ) E(L ) RC(L ) E(L )
RC(L L ) RC(L ) RC(L ).
+≤ +
⇔+ + + ≤+ ++
⇔+ ≤+
  







W R C ( L) W R C ( L)
R C (L )E (L ) R C ( L ) E ( L )
RC( L ) RC(L ).
λ⋅ =λ⋅
⇔λ ⋅ + λ ⋅ = λ ⋅ + λ ⋅









WRC(L L) WRC(L ) L
RC(L L) E(L L) RC(L ) E(L ) L
RC(L L) RC(L ).
+= +










bb b b :L/ [ B( 1r ) ] =⋅ +   A  as the uncertain “loss rate” of credit b. Then we have: 
ˆˆ ˆ bb b
(B) (sum) (B)
bb b b b b b
b1 b1 b1
L(B) L B (1 r ) B y (1 r ).
== =
== ⋅ ⋅ + =⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ∑∑ ∑    AA  (A.1) 










(WRC ) (B) (f) (B) (f) (max) (D ) (f)
bb b b d
b1
E(c (B)) B (r r ) E(L(B)) (1 E(r ) r ) D (E(r ) r )




= ⋅−− ⋅ + −− ⋅ −





 (A.2)   8
For given deposits, a higher value of  1 E(c (B))
−   corresponds with a higher value of 
1
ˆ b
(WRC ) (B) (f) (B) (f)
bb b b
b1
( B ) : B [ r r E ( )( 1 r )( 1 E ( r ) r ) ]
=
µ= ⋅−− ⋅ + ⋅ + − ∑   A . (A.3) 
For a given expectation value  :( B ) µ = µ , the credit portfolios with a minimum of regulatory 




ˆ 1 b B ,..., B
RC[B , ..., B ] min .!
µµ




(WRC ) ( ) (B) (f) (B) (f)
bb b b
b1
µ B [r r E( ) (1 r ) (1 E(r ) r )].
µ
=
=⋅ − − ⋅ + ⋅ + − ∑   A  (A.5) 
With λ µ as a Lagrangian multiplier, the necessary conditions are 
1 (WRC ) (B) (f) (B) (f)
bb b ()
b




=λ ⋅ − − ⋅ + ⋅ + − =
∂
  A . (A.6) 
Since (from axiom (Ax3)) 
() () () ()
ˆˆ 11 bb RC[c B , ..., c B ] c RC[B , ..., B ]
µµ µ µ ⋅⋅ = ⋅  for all c ≥  0, RC is 
homogeneous of degree one so that we get from Euler’s Homogeneous Function Theorem  
ˆ b
() () ()
ˆ 1b () b
b1 b
RC





∂  =⋅  ∂ ∑ . (A.7) 
Under consideration of (A.5) and (A.6), the result (A.7) implies 
() ()
ˆ 1 b RC B , ..., B
µµ




(WRC ) (sum) ( ) (B) (f) (B) (f)
bb b b
b1
B y [r r E( ) (1 r ) (1 E(r ) r )],
µ
=
µ = ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅+ ⋅+ − ∑   A  (A.9) 
a variation of µ can be reached by a variation of B
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As a consequence, for given credit portfolio structure (y1, …,  ˆ b y ) variations of B
(sum) imply 
(µ, RC)-combinations that are all located on the same straight line. The optimal credit portfolio 
structure thus does not depend on the given values of µ and B
(sum). Since the set of risky credit 
portfolios is convex in the µ− RC space due to the Lemma, the second-order conditions for a 
minimum regarding the problem (A.4) are satisfied. 
A variation of D and r
(D) does not influence the fact that the bank (following optimization 
problem (2)) will prefer alternatives with higher values for  (B) µ  and lower values for RC. Thus, 
the proof above is independent of the concrete specification of D and r
(D). The same argument can 
be used to justify the last two sentences of part 1) of the Proposition. 
2) 






(WRC ) (sum) ( ) (B) (f) (B) (f) (max) (D ) (f)
bb b b d
b1
ˆ b
(sum) ( ) (RC) (su
bb
b1
E(c (B)) E(c (B)) RC(B) [1 E(r (RC(B)))] C(RC(B))
B y [ r r E () ( 1r) ( 1E ( r )r) ]D ( E ( r )r)






=− ⋅ + −
=⋅ ⋅ − −⋅ + ⋅ + − −⋅ −






















   
 ⋅⋅          
 





 (A.11)   10
of the maximization problem (2) implies an inner solution for B
(sum), if C and/or 
(RC) E(r )   are 
strictly convex functions. 
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